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As many critics have observed, in Pynchon, Modernity is depicted under the sign of 
Max Weber in the form of an oppressive rationalisation which banishes and dominates 
all that would stand in its way: “[t]he death of magic” as Jeff Baker puts it. Whether 
such a totalising appraisal of Weber is justified remains under debate, yet the insertion
of this thought into the very core of America's political system is no better expressed 
than in Gravity's Rainbow's “MOM SLOTHROP'S LETTER TO AMBASSADOR KENNEDY”. 
This letter, which depicts Slothrop's mother writing to Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr. about her 
feelings of affinity for his parental unease during JFK's Patrol Torpedo boat incident in 
1943, her anxiety about the state of America and her sexual relations with the future 
president, seems to echo with the guilt-ridden style of Samuel Beckett's Eh Joe? This 
comparative effect is achieved not only through the structural motion from an 
optimistic inquiry, “Well hi Joe how've ya been”, parallel to Beckett's “You’re all right 
now, eh?”, before becoming “gloomy all so sudden”, but also by the frequent comma 
delimited first name appellation to the ambassador: “It's every parent's dream, Joe, 
that it is […] It isn't starting to break down, is it, Joe? […] You know, don't you? Golden 
clouds? Sometimes I think – ah, Joe, I think they're pieces of the heavenly city falling 
down”. While Beckett's piece focuses upon an old man listening to an ex-lover holding 
him to account for a young girl's suicide, Pynchon's microcosmic imitation uses the 
guilt-tripping voice of a “wicked old babe” to demonstrate that the love-'em and 
leave-'em approach of big business leads to a “terrible fear” and a rightly-felt difficulty
believing “in a Plan with a shape bigger than I can see”; it is an approach which 
Pynchon depicts as having “laid”, in Beckett's terms, the general populous with its 
promise to use the “WLB” (War Labor Board) to keep the war effort on track and 
suppress “strike votes”, while insidiously profiting from the continuation of the war. 
Furthermore, it is a project of Weberian disenchantment; “Golden clouds” and the 
“heavenly city” resonate not only with the example of “the golden mountain” which 
Deleuze deploys to demonstrate Foucault's statements, but are of a thoroughly 
enchanted, metaphysical nature that is destroyed, or “broken down”, in the 
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Benjaminian battering of Klee's angel. Ultimately, the young girl of America, the spirit 
made light, will face her suicidal moment but, in the meantime, without seeing the 
whole plan, Nalline Slothrop can only have faith that Ambassador Kennedy is “in the 
groove” and take his word – “How true!” – that “we've got to modernize in 
Massachusetts, or it'll just keep getting worse and worse”.
Alongside the relativism that is so crucial to Weber's, and Pynchon's, projects, 
this concept of slavish obedience, or trust in authority to think on our behalf – and 
especially when that authority insists that we modernize through technological 
positivism – is central to two essays bearing the same title – 'What is Enlightenment?' 
– the first written by Immanuel Kant, the second by Michel Foucault. In Kant's original 
piece on Enlightenment, he describes unenlightened humanity as being in a state of 
immaturity, enslaved to our self-incurred tutelage. For Foucault, Kant represents the 
“threshold of modernity”, the moment when representation began to criticize Ideology
and to structure its bounds according to the preconditions of perception. Foucault's 
response to Kant's essay is, however, unsure of whether the ultimate maturity that 
Kant proposes can ever be attained.
This paper is a subset of the most recent chapter I have written for my DPhil 
thesis which undertakes a revision of the existing critical scepticism towards Foucault 
in Pynchon scholarship in response to Hanjo Berressem's call for an appraisal of 
specificities of Enlightenment. Today, I do not, sadly, have time to give an overview of 
the entire survey I have conducted of Foucault's work on Enlightenment and the 
parallel readings of di- and con-vergence that I have undertaken.  I will, therefore, limit
myself to a discussion of the third element upon which this interaction has turned; an 
axis of ipseic ethics; the relation one has to oneself.
The  second  of  Foucault's  pieces  under  the  title  “What  is  Enlightenment”
complements the first, providing the promised close reading of Kant's article which,
although acknowledged as a “minor text”, is still  not quite on par with Nietzsche's
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laundry list  in  the lowbrow stakes.  By  way of  broad synopsis,  Foucault's  article  is
structured into two sections and a brief conclusion. The first of these sections is very
much a restatement of the notion of philosophy found in the preceding text; Kant as
the threshold of modernity wherein all post-Kantian philosophical thought possesses a
degree of historicity and reflexivity upon the present. The second portion of Foucault's
essay is, admittedly, still derived from the lecture, but is substantially more interesting
for both its extension and refinement of terms.
In this second section, Foucault seeks to define “modernity as an attitude rather
than as a period of history”, which is then clarified as a way “of acting and behaving
that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a
task”.  It  is,  in  short,  “a  bit  like  what  the  Greeks  called  an  ēthos”.  Foucault  then,
incongruously,  extends  this  period  of  modernity  under  Kant  into  the  notions  of
modernity as he sees them relayed by Baudelaire in The Painter of Modern Life. Under
this schema, Foucault sees an ironic heroization of the present, in which the present
moment is made sacred so that, in its elevation, it becomes possible to imagine it
otherwise. This reimagination of the present moves from  ēthos  to ethic when the
modern  subject,  in  this  mode  of  creative  refashioning,  is  redefined  as  one  who
undertakes “to face the task of producing himself”, a production that can only take
place “in another, a different place, which Baudelaire calls art”. Negatively defining
Enlightenment,  Foucault  still  seeks,  at  this point,  to effect  a critical  relation which
avoids the “Enlightenment blackmail”  and which does not  conflate humanism and
Enlightenment. Positively speaking, Foucault situates the Enlightenment ethos as the
transformation  of  Kantian  critique  into  a  lived  exploration  of  “limit-attitude”,  to
transform it “into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing-over”.
This leads to the necessity for a historicised critique, to avoid the universal values that
are bestowed by criticism that seeks formal structures, a critique that must also be
experimental:  “I  shall  thus  characterize  the philosophical  ethos  appropriate  to  the
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critical  ontology  of  ourselves as  a historico-practical  test  of  the limits  we may go
beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings”.
Much of Pynchon's historicity lends itself to a reading in this vein. A way of re-
conceptualising the anachronistic mode in  Mason & Dixon, for example, would be to
situate the characters as possessing a heightened sense of their modernity, at the
dawn  of  modernity.  Furthermore,  several  of  Pynchon's  novels  end  on  an  ironic
heroization of the present, mostly because the present, or future, is apocalyptic, be it
in Gravity's Rainbow's faux optimistic “Now everybody– ”, Vineland and Inherent Vice's
elegiac fogs for  the Sixties,  or  Against the Day's  airborne sailing towards “grace”,
which seems to symmetrically parallel in its analeptic reference to World War I and re-
insertion of the Calvinist theme, the earlier nautical climax to V.. However, one of the
most prominent critiques that could be levelled at Pynchon's work is that such an
ironic heroization is not deployed to imagine otherwise, but to nihilistically mourn and
nostalgically lament for a repeated cycle of failure, perhaps now coming to Blicero's
escape,  in  no  positive  sense.  This  has  been  none  more  so  pronounced  than  in
Slothrop's disintegration in Gravity's Rainbow:
Slothrop, as noted, at least as early as the Anubis era, has begun to
thin,  to  scatter.  “Personal  density,”  Kurt  Mondaugen  in  his  Peene-
münde office not too many steps away from here, enunciating the Law
which will one day bear his name, “is directly proportional to temporal
bandwidth.” 
“Temporal bandwidth” is the width of your present, your now. It is the
familiar “At” considered as a dependent variable. The more you dwell in
the past and in the future, the thicker your bandwidth, the more solid
your persona. But the narrower your sense of Now, the more tenuous
you are. It may get to where you’re having trouble remembering what
you  were  doing  five  minutes  ago,  or  even—as  Slothrop  now—what
you’re doing here, at the base of this colossal curved embankment. . . . 
In the period between 1975 and 1981, no fewer than six critical articles examined this
passage, finding it symptomatic of a dis-empowered contemporary subject. Although
this  passage  has,  obviously,  been  debated  ad  nauseum  in  Pynchon  studies,  its
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importance  for  thinking  on  freedom  within  an  Enlightenment  context  has  been
overlooked.  From  an  initial  objection  to  Pynchon  as  a  critic,  but  also  product,  of
modernity,  comes  a  stunning  resonance  with  late  Foucault's  aforementioned
statement on philosophical ethos: “a historico-practical test of the limits we may go
beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings”. The
relationship one has to oneself, which the late Foucault believes is the true sphere of
ethics, is the area with the greatest scope for agency for the historically contingent
subject.  Given  also  that  Pynchon  has  written  in  praise  of  sloth  –  with  particular
reference to Melville's Bartleby as a refusal of the capitalist paradigm (yet does not the
cycle  of  efficiency  and  then  human  redundancy  push  people  ever  closer  to  a
mandatory idleness?) – it would appear hugely inconsistent for Pynchon to judge his
nominatively assonative protagonist for refusing to work, even if that work is on the
relationship  to  himself,  through time.  For  is  not  Slothrop's  “sin”  a  refusal  to  work
against the entropy of the subject in a blindness to history?
It  would  seem superficially,  from  his  sloth  essay,  that  a  Pynchonian  ethics
cannot regard inaction as unethical. Pynchon begins this work with an examination of
Thomas de Aquinas' concept of acedia as sorrow in the face of God's good. However,
Pynchon quickly moves through the historical progression to see, in Franklin's Poor
John, a transformation of Sloth from a sin of sorrow in the face of God's good, to one of
sorrow in the face of capitalism's good:
Spiritual  matters were not quite as immediate as material ones, like
productivity! Sloth was no longer so much a Sin against God or spiritual
good as against a particular sort of time, uniform, one-way, in general
not reversible -- that is, against clock time, which got everybody early
to bed and early to rise.
Sloth here becomes a transgressive act that violates the compulsion to productive
action and is, therefore, a form of resistance. Of course, such a stance is troubling in
our contemporary understanding of Sloth as a failure to act against political evil, and
Pynchon understands this:
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In this century we have come to think of Sloth as primarily political, a
failure of public will  allowing the introduction of evil policies and the
rise of evil regimes, the worldwide fascist ascendancy of the 1920's and
30's being perhaps Sloth's finest hour, though the Vietnam era and the
Reagan-Bush years are not far behind. [...] Occasions for choosing good
present themselves in public and private for us every day, and we pass
them by. Acedia is the vernacular of everyday moral life. Though it has
never lost its deepest notes of mortal anxiety, it never gets as painful
as outright despair, or as real, for it is despair bought at a discount
price,  a  deliberate  turning  against  faith  in  anything  because  of  the
inconvenience faith presents to the pursuit of quotidian lusts, angers
and  the  rest.  The  compulsive  pessimist's  last  defense  --  stay  still
enough and the blade of the scythe, somehow, will pass by -- Sloth is
our background radiation, our easy-listening station -- it is everywhere,
and no longer noticed.
As one might expect, then, Pynchon does not present a unified stance on Sloth. In one
capacity, or perhaps at one historical moment, Sloth offered an escape from linear
time;  it  was  the  resistance.  Somewhere  along  this  line  of  thought,  however,  the
process was reversed and Sloth became seen as complicit.  The only linking factor
between  these  historical  periods  has  been  a  moral  disdain  towards  Sloth  by  the
dominant authority. However, Sloth in itself cannot be a universal sin, in Pynchon's
view, because it turns upon an evaluation of the contingent underlying moral concept.
This is, in fact, the same argument that Aquinas deployed for a universal injunction
against Sloth and with which Pynchon begins in apparent antagonism: “For sorrow is
evil in itself when it is about that which is apparently evil but good in reality, even as,
on the other hand, pleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is, in
truth, evil”. The actual alignment here can be seen, however, even in the working title
of Gravity's Rainbow, “Mindless Pleasures”, in which there is the conflation of Aquinian
thinking and confusion (“mindless” and “which seems to be”) with ascetic morality
(“pleasures”). In short, the stance that can be derived from the Sloth essay is that
Pynchonian ethics comes down to judgement of a contingent action's validity while
Aquinian morality proposes a universal action as a safeguard against misjudgement.
Understanding Pynchon as one who disavows universally valid moral action, this
reading moves a step-closer to a Foucauldian “historico-practical test of the limits we
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may go beyond”, but with an important inflection. First, it should be carefully noted
that this brand of relativism is diametrically opposed to the conventional genealogy of
morals; it is not the underlying moral precept (opposition to Fascism, opposition to
oppression) which is relative – indeed, this is still an open possibility, but not explicitly
touched upon in Pynchon's essay – but instead, the action one should take (it is wrong
to be slothful when Sloth will permit Fascism, but it is not wrong to be slothful if Sloth
counters fiscal oppression). In this sense, Pynchon does not present the conventional
and oft-critiqued, although not entirely accurate, version of a Foucauldian contingent
subject, but rather the later Foucauldian subject of modernity who fashions himself
and  for  whom there  is  limited  personal  agency.  Second,  to  understand  Pynchon's
writing on temporal bandwidth it becomes necessary to take Foucauldian genealogy
further than it would traditionally stretch in terms, as already mentioned, of trans-
temporal metaphor.
 Yet, the second half of Foucault's proposition – the link to work upon the self as
a free being – is not an area in which Slothrop excels. While he does indeed, in his
scattering  and  disassembly,  transcend  the  human's  limits,  his  realm  of  agency  is
seriously limited: he is “sent into the Zone”, his fate as determined as Weissman's by
the tarot and his subconscious; “to help him deny what he could not possibly admit:
that he might be in love, in sexual love, with his, and his race's, death”. This portion of
Gravity's  Rainbow is,  however,  enveloped  in  an  exceedingly  complex  narrative
structure. The voice proclaiming that Slothrop's fate was bound up in esoteric tarot
systems cuts, across the ellipses, to “world-renowned analyst Mickey Wuxtry-Wuxtry”
for  the  restriction  of  agency  via  psychoanalysis,  before  moving  to  an  unexpected
format,  an  interview  of  a  “spokesman  for  the  Counterfoce”  with  the  Wall  Street
Journal. This relegation of Slothrop to third party discussion is in keeping with the low
levels of linguistic transitivity – a feature examined in “Under the Rose” and V. by M.
Angeles Martínez – and, therefore, agency throughout GR; consider, for instance, the
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famous passage:
The letters:
MB DRO
ROSHI
appear  above  the  logo  of  some  occupation  newspaper,  a  grinning
glamour girl riding astraddle the cannon of a tank
Rather than presenting this as a statement actively read by Slothrop, the sentence 
contains only an affected object intransitively appearing; certainly an apt 
representation for such a brutal event as an atomic bombing. 
It  is not necessary,  however, to resort  to such formalist  analysis to see this
constriction of agency. The Counterforce has been styled – in as parodic a fashion as
though  it  were,  itself,  named  “Wuxtry-Wuxtry”  –  as  childlike  throughout  Gravity's
Rainbow.  Although  Terry  Caeser  has  linked  the  “suck  hour”  in  V. and  the  “Gross
Suckling Conference” in GR to maternity, it is in fact the flip-side of this relationship
that is being explored: the state of childhood. This is clearly seen in the linked context
of  Against the Day, where Darby Suckling is described, in the opening pages, as the
“baby” of the crew, which leads to the more likely conclusion that “Gross Suckling” is
less  of  a  reflection  on  the  transition  from maternity  to  motherhood,  and  more  a
statement  on  the  immaturity,  or  baby-ness,  of  the  Counterforce  effort,  further
confirmed  by  the  German  rendition:  “Der  Grob  Säugling”.  The  Counterforce  is  as
incapable of commenting on Slothrop's limitations as any other, for “They are schizoid,
as double-minded in the massive presence of money, as any of the rest of us”. It
seems  that,  in  Pynchon's  terms,  human  beings  are  psychologically  incapable  of
mounting a resistance in the face of external temptation: “As long as they allow us a
glimpse, however rarely. We need that”. While this in no sense precludes agency in the
relation to one's self, it does encroach upon the impact such a self-fashioning could
ever have. In its immaturity, the Counterforce must be deemed unenlightened.
The final portion of Foucault's last Enlightenment piece is a pre-emptive rebuff
to a “no doubt entirely legitimate” objection:  “If  we limit ourselves to this type of
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always partial and local inquiry or test, do we not run the risk of letting ourselves be
determined by more general structures of which we may well not be conscious and
over which we may have no control?” To this, Foucault gives two responses. We must,
firstly, “give up hope of ever acceding to a point of view that could give us access to
any complete and definitive knowledge [connaissance]  or what may constitute our
historical limits”. From here, “the theoretical and practical experience we have of our
limits,  and  of  the  possibility  of  moving  beyond  them,  is  always  limited  and
determined”.  However,  “that  does  not  mean that  no work can  be done except  in
disorder and contingency”, it must instead be probed in the question: “how can the
growth of capabilities [capacités] be disconnected from the intensification of power
relations?” This can only be studied by analysing concrete practices consisting of the
“forms of rationality that organize their ways of doing things” (“their technological
side”) and the actions of subjects which reflexively modify this techne (“their strategic
side”).  This  is  to  explored  through  “relations  of  control  over  things”  (“the  axis  of
knowledge”), “relations of action upon others” (“the axis of power”) and “relations
with oneself” (“the axis of ethics”).
This seems, then, to be the aporetic final structure upon which Pynchon's works
come to rest. Even if we are able, in some sense, to determine ourselves as subjects,
partial knowledge means there is always the potential for larger, unknown structures
to impinge upon that determination with little opportunity for feedback. Amid ever
narrowing opportunities for the “good unsought and uncompensated” – for how would
we  know  them?  –  is  a  Voltarian  hortensial  contraction  even  possible?  Foucault
suggests that maintaining a positivist approach is viable, as long as there exists a
concerted effort to decouple progress from the amplification of power relations. On the
other  hand,  Pynchon's  intrinsic  linkage  of  the  spheres  of  identity  and  concrete
practices, that Foucault here separates, is clear from his closing remarks in “Nearer My
Couch to Thee”: “what now seems increasingly to define us – technology”. This has
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the effect of extending the sphere of the ethical beyond the Foucauldian axis of ethics;
ipseic relations are not disentangled from, but progressively knotted into the world, to
paraphrase  GR.  Furthermore,  the  strategic  elements,  the  failed  Counterforce,  the
Chums of Chance, Mason and Dixon are not foiled because they are unaware of the
overarching  structures  that  determine  them,  but  because  from  Pynchon's
psychological, humanist approach it is deduced that they are intrinsically incapable of
non-complicity.  In  regard to the seamy underside of  the Enlightenment,  the divide
between Pynchon and Foucault seems to hinge on what we can, in both a Kantian and
practical sense, know, not necessarily, as has always been supposed, on who, or how,
we can dominate, for according to Pynchon: “We do know what's going on, and we let
it go on”.
